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We consider a nonlinear kinetic equation of Boltzmann type which takes into account the influence
of conviction during the formation of opinion in a system of agents which interact through the binary
exchanges introduced in [G. Toscani, Commun. Math. Sci. 4, 481(2006)]. The original exchange
mechanism, which is based on the human tendency to compromise and change of opinion through
self-thinking, is here modified in the parameters of the compromise and diffusion terms, which now
are assumed to depend on the personal degree of conviction. The numerical simulations show that
the presence of conviction has the potential to break symmetry, and to produce clusters of opinions.
The model is partially inspired by the recent work [L. Pareschi, G. Toscani, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A
372, 20130396 (2014)], in which the role of knowledge in the formation of wealth distribution has
been investigated.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 87.23.Ge, 05.10.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the dynamics of opinion formation in a
multi-agent society has received growing attention [1–7].
In reason of its cooperative nature, it appeared natu-
ral to resort to tools and methods typical of statistical
mechanics to study such systems [8, 9]. The approaches
considered so far range from cellular automata, especially
used for numerical simulation, to models of mean field
type, which lead to systems of (ordinary or partial) dif-
ferential equations, to kinetic models of opinion forma-
tion [10–15]. In kinetic models, the variation of opinion
is obtained through binary interactions between agents.
In view of the relation between parameters in the micro-
scopic binary rules, the society develops a certain steady
macroscopic opinion distribution [16, 17], which charac-
terizes the formation of a relative consensus around cer-
tain opinions.
The relevant aspects to be taken into account when
modelling binary interactions in opinion formation have
been identified in the compromise process [4, 18], in
which individuals tend to reach a compromise after ex-
change of opinions, and the self-thinking [15], where in-
dividuals change their opinion in a diffusive fashion.
Following this line of thought, a wide class of kinetic
models of opinion formation, based on two-body interac-
tions involving both compromise and diffusion properties
in exchanges between individuals, has been introduced
in [15]. These models are sufficiently general to take into
account a large variety of human behaviors, and to re-
produce in many cases explicit steady profiles from which
one can easily elaborate information on the macroscopic
opinion distribution. This type of modelling has subse-
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quently been applied to various situations in [11–13, 19].
More recently, a further relevant parameter, strongly
related to the problem of opinion formation, has been
taken into account in [20]. Resembling the model for
wealth exchange in a multi-agent society introduced in
[21], this new has an additional parameter to quantify
the personal conviction, representing a measure of the
influencing ability of individuals. Individuals with high
conviction are resistant to change opinion, and have a
prominent role in attracting other individuals towards
their opinions. In this sense, individuals with high con-
viction play the role of leaders [19].
The role of conviction has been subsequently consid-
ered by other authors. It was shown in [20] that beyond
a certain value of this conviction parameter, the soci-
ety reaches a consensus, where one of the two choices
(positive or negative) provided to the individuals pre-
vails, thereby spontaneously breaking a discrete symme-
try. A further model in which this parameter has been
taken into account was proposed in [22]. There, the
self-conviction and the ability to influence others were
taken as independent variables. Also, exact solutions of
a discrete opinion formation model with conviction were
found by Biswas in [23]. In [24, 25], conviction has been
introduced as relevant parameter in a class of discrete
opinion models. Within this class, each agent opinion
takes only discrete values, and its time evolution is ruled
by two terms, one representing binary interactions be-
tween individuals, and the other the degree of conviction
or persuasion (a self-interaction).
In all the aforementioned models, conviction is real-
ized by a fixed-in-time parameter (or a random vari-
able), eventually different for different individuals. Con-
sequently, while it is clear that a certain distribution of
this parameter among agents leads to a steady distribu-
tion of opinions with properties which are related to it,
it is not completely clarified why conviction has to be
assumed with a certain distribution.
All these studies, however, indicate that, among the
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2various behavioral aspects that determine a certain opin-
ion formation, conviction represents an important vari-
able to be taken into account. This problem has deep
analogies with a recent study of one of the present au-
thors with Pareschi [26], where the role of knowledge in
wealth distribution forming has been studied by allowing
agents to depend on two variables, denoting knowledge
and wealth respectively. There, a kinetic equation for the
evolution of knowledge has been coupled with a kinetic
model for wealth distribution, by allowing binary trades
to be dependent of the personal degree of knowledge.
Mutatis mutandis, we will assume in this paper that in-
dividuals are characterized by two variables, representing
conviction and, respectively, opinion. Following the line
of thought in [26], we will introduce here a kinetic model
for conviction formation, by assuming that the way in
which conviction is formed is independent of the personal
opinion. Then, the (personal) conviction parameter will
enter into the microscopic binary interactions for opin-
ion formation considered in [15], to modify them in the
compromise and self-thinking terms. Within this picture,
both the conviction and the opinion are modified in time
in terms of microscopic interactions. As we shall see by
numerical investigation, the role of the additional con-
viction variable is to bring the system towards a steady
distribution in which there is formation of clusters even
in absence of bounded confidence hypotheses [1–3, 27].
In our kinetic model for conviction formation, we will
assume that the relevant terms responsible of the mod-
ification of the conviction are from one side the the ac-
quisition of information, and from the other side the pos-
sibility of afterthought and to think back, which appear
to be natural and universal features. In reason of this,
the positive parameter that quantifies conviction can ei-
ther increase (through information) or decrease (through
afterthought). The relevant aspect is that information
will be achieved though the surrounding, thus producing
a linear kinetic model. Note that it is assumed here that
the individual conviction is not correlated to personal
opinion, thus allowing formation of conviction without
resorting to the distribution of opinions. Then, the lin-
ear conviction interaction will be coupled with the binary
exchange of opinion introduced in [15], which includes
both the compromise propensity and the the change of
the personal opinion due to self-thinking. In the new in-
teraction rule both the compromise and the self-thinking
part of the opinion exchange depend on the personal con-
viction. A typical and natural assumption is that high
conviction could act on the interaction process both to
reduce the personal propensity to compromise, and to re-
duce the self-thinking in the interaction. These rules will
subsequently be merged, within the principles of classi-
cal kinetic theory, to derive a nonlinear Boltzmann-like
kinetic equation for the joint evolution of conviction and
opinion variables.
The kinetic approach revealed to be a powerful tool
[17, 28], complementary to the numerous theoretical and
numerical studies that can be found in the recent phys-
ical and economic literature on these subjects. On the
other hand, as many other approaches, the study of the
socio-economic behavior of a (real) population of agents
by means of kinetic models with very few (essential) pa-
rameters is able to capture only partially the extremely
complex behavior of such systems. The idea to intro-
duce as additional parameter the conviction in the study
of opinion formation goes exactly into the direction to
give a more accurate description of the human behavior.
Not surprisingly, the description of the evolution of pair
conviction–opinion in terms of a kinetic equation gives
rise to a variety of challenging mathematical problems,
both from the theoretical and numerical point of view.
In particular, concerning the distribution of conviction,
it is remarkable that this class of simple models is able to
reproduce various features always present in the reality,
like the presence of a considerable number of undecided
in the population, as well as the formation of clusters of
opinions in the steady distribution.
To end this introduction, we outline that the problem
of clustering is of paramount importance in this context.
Indeed, models for opinion formation belong to the va-
riety of models for self-organized dynamics in social, bi-
ological, and physical sciences [28], which assume that
the intensity of alignment increases as agents get closer,
reflecting a common tendency to align with those who
think or act alike. As noticed by Motsch and Tadmor [16]
similarity breeds connection reflects our intuition that in-
creasing the intensity of alignment as the difference of
positions decreases is more likely to lead to a consen-
sus. However, it is argued in [16] that the converse is
true: when the dynamics is driven by local interactions,
it is more likely to approach a consensus when the in-
teractions among agents increase as a function of their
difference in position. In absence of further parameters,
heterophily, the tendency to bond more with those who
are different rather than with those who are similar, plays
a decisive role in the process of clustering. This motivates
further our choice to resort to the additional role of con-
viction.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we in-
troduce and discuss the linear kinetic model for the for-
mation of conviction in a multi-agent society. This linear
model is based on microscopic interactions with a fixed
background, and is such that the density of the popula-
tion conviction converges towards a steady distribution
which is heavily dependent of the microscopic parame-
ters of the microscopic interactions. Then, the conviction
rule is merged with the binary interaction for opinion to
obtain a nonlinear kinetic model of Boltzmann-type for
the joint density of conviction and opinion. This part
is presented in Section III. Last, Section IV is devoted
to various numerical experiments, which allow to recover
the steady joint distribution of conviction and opinion in
the population for various choices of the relevant param-
eters.
3II. THE FORMATION OF CONVICTION
To give a precise and well-established definition of con-
viction is beyond our purposes. Instead of resorting to a
definition it seems natural to agree on certain universal
aspects about it. Conviction can be described as a certain
resistance to modify a personal behavior. How the per-
sonal amount of conviction is formed is a very difficult
question. We can reasonably argue that, among other
reasons, responsible of conviction forming include famil-
iar environment, personal contacts, readings or skills ac-
quired through experience or education. It is natural to
assume that conviction (at least concerning some aspects
of life like religious or political beliefs) is in part inherited
in the interior of family from the parents, but it is also
evident that the the main factor that can influence it is
the social background in which the individual grows and
lives [29]. Indeed, the experiences that lead to be con-
vinced about something can not be fully inherited from
the parents, such as the eye color, but rather are acquired
by several elements of the environment. This process is
manifold and produces different results for each individ-
ual in a population. Like in knowledge formation, al-
though all individuals are given the same opportunities,
at the end of the process every individual appears to have
a different level of conviction about something. Also, it
is almost evident that the personal conviction is heavily
dependent on the individual nature. A consistent part of
us is accustomed to rethink, and to have continuous af-
terthoughts on many aspects of our daily decisions. This
is particularly true nowadays, where the global access to
information via web gives to each individual the possi-
bility to have a reservoir of infinite capacity from which
to extract any type of (useful or not) information, very
often producing insecurity.
The previous remarks are at the basis of a suitable
description of the evolution of the distribution of convic-
tion in a population of agents by means of microscopic
interactions with a fixed background. We will proceed
as in [26]. Each variation of conviction is interpreted as
an interaction where a fraction of the conviction of the
individual is lost by virtue of afterthoughts and insecu-
rities, while at the same time the individual can absorb
a certain amount of conviction through the information
achieved from the external background (the surrounding
environment). In our approach, we quantify the convic-
tion of the individual in terms of a scalar parameter x,
ranging from zero to infinity. Denoting with z ≥ 0 the
degree of conviction achieved from the background, it is
assumed that the new amount of conviction in a single
interaction can be computed as
x∗ = (1− λ(x))x+ λB(x)z + κH(x). (2.1)
In (2.1) the functions λ = λ(x) and λB = λB(x) quan-
tify, respectively, the personal amounts of insecurity and
willingness to be convinced by others, while κ is a ran-
dom parameter which takes into account the possible un-
predictable modifications of the conviction process. We
will in general fix the mean value of κ equal to zero.
Last, H(·) will denote an increasing function of convic-
tion. The typical choice is to take H(x) = xν , with
0 < ν ≤ 1. Since some insecurity is always present, and
at the same time it can not exceed a certain amount of
the total conviction, it is assumed that λ− ≤ λ(x) ≤ λ+,
where λ− > 0, and λ+ < 1. Likewise, we will assume
an upper bound for the willingness to be convinced by
the environment. Then, 0 ≤ λB(x) ≤ λ¯, where λ¯ < 1.
Lastly, the random part is chosen to satisfy the lower
bound κ ≥ −(1 − λ+). By these assumptions, it is as-
sured that the post-interaction value x∗ of the conviction
is nonnegative.
Let C(z), z ≥ 0 denote the probability distribution of
degree of conviction of the (fixed) background. We will
suppose that C(z) has a bounded mean, so that∫
R+
C(z) dz = 1;
∫
R+
z C(z) dz = M (2.2)
We note that the distribution of the background will in-
duce a certain policy of acquisition of conviction. This
aspect has been discussed in [26], from which we extract
the example that follow. Let us assume that the back-
ground is a random variable uniformly distributed on the
interval (0, a), where a > 0 is a fixed constant. If we
choose for simplicity λ(x) = λB(x) = λ¯, and the indi-
vidual has a degree of conviction x > a, in absence of
randomness the interaction will always produce a value
x∗ ≤ x, namely a partial decrease of conviction. In this
case, in fact, the process of insecurity in an individual
with high conviction can not be restored by interaction
with the environment.
The study of the time-evolution of the distribution of
conviction produced by binary interactions of type (2.1)
can be obtained by resorting to kinetic collision-like mod-
els [17]. Let F = F (x, t) the density of agents which at
time t > 0 are represented by their conviction x ∈ R+.
Then, the time evolution of F (x, t) obeys to a Boltzmann-
like equation. This equation is usually written in weak
form. It corresponds to say that the solution F (x, t) sat-
isfies, for all smooth functions ϕ(x) (the observable quan-
tities)
d
dt
∫
R+
F (x, t)ϕ(x) dx =〈∫
R2+
(
ϕ(x∗)− ϕ(x))F (x, t)C(z) dx dz〉. (2.3)
In (2.3) the post-interaction conviction x∗ is given by
(2.1). As usual, 〈·〉 represents mathematical expectation.
Here expectation takes into account the presence of the
random parameter κ in (2.1).
The meaning of the kinetic equation (2.3) is the follow-
ing. At any positive time t > 0, the variation in time of
the distribution of conviction (the left-hand side) results
from a balance equation in which, through interaction
with the background we gain agents with conviction x∗
4loosing agents with conviction x. This change is mea-
sured by the interaction operator at the right-hand side.
In order to verify if the kinetic equation (2.3) gives rea-
sonable outputs on the distribution of conviction among
the population of agents, let us study some of its prop-
erties. It is immediate to recognize that equation (2.3)
preserves the total mass, so that F (x, t), t > 0, remains
a probability density if it is so initially. By choosing
ϕ(x) = x we recover the evolution of the mean convic-
tion MC(t) of the agents system, which gives a first mea-
sure of the conviction rate. The mean value satisfies the
equation
dMC(t)
dt
= −
∫
R+
xλ(x)F (t) dx+M
∫
R+
λB(x)F (t) dx,
(2.4)
which in general it is not explicitly solvable, unless the
functions λ(x) and λB(x) are assumed to be constant.
However, since λ(x) ≥ λ−, while λB(x) ≤ λ¯, the mean
value always satisfies the differential inequality
dMC(t)
dt
≤ −λ−MC(t) + λ¯M, (2.5)
which guarantees that the mean conviction of the system
will never exceed the (finite) value Mmax given by
Mmax =
λ¯
λ−
M.
If λ(x) = λ and λB(x) = λB are constant, equation (2.4)
becomes
dMC(t)
dt
= −λMC(t) + λBM. (2.6)
In this case, the linear differential equation can be solved,
and
MC(t) = MC(0)e
−λt +
λBM
λ
(
1− e−λt) . (2.7)
Formula (2.7) shows that the mean conviction converges
exponentially to its limit value λBM/λ. Note that by
increasing the parameter λ which measures the personal
amount of insecurity we decrease the final mean convic-
tion.
A further insight into the linear kinetic equation (2.3)
can be obtained by resorting to particular asymptotics
which lead to Fokker-Planck equations [30]. In order to
describe the asymptotic process, let us discuss in some
details the evolution equation for the mean conviction,
given by (2.6). For simplicity, and without loss of gen-
erality, let us assume λ and λB constant. Given a small
parameter , the scaling
λ→ λ, λB → λB , κ→
√
κ (2.8)
is such that the mean value MC(t) satisfies
dMC(t)
dt
= − (λMC(t)− λBM) .
If we set τ = t, F(x, τ) = F (x, t), then
MC(τ) =
∫
R+
xF(x, τ) dx =
∫
R+
xF (x, τ) dx = MC(t),
and the mean value of the density F(x, τ) solves
dMC(τ)
dτ
= −λMC(τ) + λBM. (2.9)
Note that equation (2.9) does not depend explicitly on
the scaling parameter . In other words, we can reduce
in each interaction the variation of conviction, waiting
enough time to get the same law for the mean value of
the knowledge density.
We can consequently investigate the situation in which
most of the interactions produce a very small variation
of conviction (→ 0), while at the same time the evolu-
tion of the conviction density is such that (2.9) remains
unchanged. We will call this limit quasi-invariant convic-
tion limit.
Let now assume that the centered random variable
κ has bounded moments at least of order n = 3, with
〈κ2〉 = µ. Then, proceeding as in [30] (cf. also Chapter
1 in [17]), we obtain that the density F(x, τ) solves the
equation
d
dt
∫
R+
F(x, t)ϕ(x) dx =
−
∫
R+
(λ(x)x− λB(x)M) + F(x, t)ϕ′(x) dx
+
µ
2
∫
R+
H2(x)F(x, t)ϕ
′′(x) dx+R(x, τ),
(2.10)
where the remainder R is vanishing as  → 0. Conse-
quently, it is shown that, as  → 0, the density F(x, τ)
converges towards the density G(x, τ) solution of the
Fokker-Planck equation
∂G(x, τ)
∂τ
=
µ
2
∂2
∂x
(
H(x)2G(x, τ)
)
+
∂
∂x
((λ(x)x− λB(x)M)G(x, τ)) .
(2.11)
The case in which λ(x) = λ and λB(x) = λB allows to
get the explicit form of the steady distribution of convic-
tion [17]. We will present two realizations of the asymp-
totic profile, that enlighten the consequences of the choice
of a particular function H(·). First, let us consider the
case in which H(x) = x. In this case, the Fokker–Planck
equation (2.11) coincides with the one obtained in [30],
related to the steady distribution of wealth in a multi–
agent market economy. One obtains
G∞(x) =
G0
x2+2λ/µ
exp
{
−2λBM
µx
}
. (2.12)
In (2.12) the constant G0 is chosen to fix the total mass of
G∞(x) equal to one. Note that the steady profile is heavy
5tailed, and the size of the polynomial tails is related to
both λ and σ. Hence, the percentage of individuals with
high conviction is decreasing as soon as the parameter λ
of insecurity is increasing, and/or the parameter of self-
thinking is decreasing. It is moreover interesting to note
that the size of the parameter λB is important only in
the first part of the x-axis, and contributes to determine
the size of the number of undecided. Like in the case
of wealth distribution, this solution has a large middle
class, namely a large part of the population with a certain
degree of conviction, and a small poor class, namely a
small part of undecided people.
The second case refers to the choice H(x) =
√
x. Now,
people with high conviction is more resistant to change
(randomly) with respect to the previous case. On the
other hand, if the conviction is small, x < 1, the individ-
ual is less resistant to change. Direct computations now
show that the steady profile is given by
H∞(x) = H0 x−1+(2λBM)/µ exp
{
−2λ
µ
x
}
, (2.13)
where the constant H0 is chosen to fix the total mass of
H∞(x) equal to one. At difference with the previous case,
the distribution decays exponentially to infinity, thus de-
scribing a population in which there are very few agents
with a large conviction. Moreover, this distribution de-
scribes a population with a huge number of undecided
agents. Note that, since the exponent of x in H∞(·) is
strictly bigger than −1, H∞(·) is integrable for any choice
of the relevant parameters.
Other choices of the exponent ν in the range 0 < ν ≤ 1
do not lead to essential differences. The previous exam-
ples show that, despite the simplicity of the kinetic inter-
action (2.1), by acting on the coefficient of the random
part κ one can obtain very different types of steady con-
viction distributions.
III. THE BOLTZMANN EQUATION FOR
OPINION AND CONVICTION
In this section, we will join the kinetic model for con-
viction with the kinetic model for opinion formation in-
troduced in [15]. This model belongs to a class of models
in which agents are indistinguishable. In most of these
models [17] an agent’s state at any instant of time t ≥ 0 is
completely characterized by his opinion v. In agreement
with the usual assumptions of the pertinent literature,
the variable v varies continuously from −1 to 1, where
−1 and 1 denote two (extreme) opposite opinions. A
remarkable consequence of introducing a continuous dis-
tribution of opinions in the interval [−1, 1] is that the
extremal opinions do not play any particular rule.
The unknown in this model is the density (or distribu-
tion function) f = f(v, t), where v ∈ I = [−1, 1] and the
time t ≥ 0, whose time evolution is described, as shown
later, by a kinetic equation of Boltzmann type.
The precise meaning of the density f is the following.
Given the population to study, if the opinions are defined
on a sub-domain D ⊂ I , the integral∫
D
f(v, t) dv
represents the number of individuals with opinion in-
cluded in D at time t > 0. It is assumed that the density
function is normalized to 1, that is∫
I
f(v, t) dv = 1.
As always happens when dealing with a kinetic problem
in which the variable belongs to a bounded domain, this
choice introduces supplementary mathematical difficul-
ties in the correct definition of binary interactions. In
fact, it is essential to consider only interactions that do
not produce opinions outside the allowed interval, which
corresponds to imposing that the extreme opinions can-
not be crossed. This crucial limitation emphasizes the
difference between the present social interactions, where
not all outcomes are permitted, and the classical interac-
tions between molecules, or, more generally, the wealth
trades (cf. [17], Chapter 5), where the only limitation for
trades was to insure that the post-collision wealths had
to be non-negative.
In order to build a possibly realistic model, this severe
limitation has to be coupled with a reasonable physical
interpretation of the process of opinion forming. In other
words, the impossibility of crossing the boundaries has to
be a by-product of good modelling of binary interactions.
From a microscopic viewpoint, the binary interaction
in [15] are described by the rules
v∗ = v − γP (|v|)(v − w) + ΘD(|v|),
w∗ = w − γP (|w|)(w − v) + Θ˜D(|w|).
(3.1)
In (3.1), the pair (v, w), with v, w ∈ I, denotes the
opinions of two arbitrary individuals before the interac-
tion, and (v∗, w∗) their opinions after exchanging infor-
mation between each other and with the exterior. The
coefficient γ ∈ (0, 1/2) is a given constant, while Θ and
Θ˜ are random variables with the same distribution, with
zero mean and variance σ2, taking values on a set B ⊆ R.
The constant γ and the variance σ2 measure respectively
the compromise propensity and the degree of spreading of
opinion due to diffusion, which describes possible changes
of opinion due to personal access to information (self-
thinking). Finally, the functions P (·) and D(·) take into
account the local relevance of compromise and diffusion
for a given opinion.
Let us describe in detail the interaction on the right-
hand side of (3.1). The first part is related to the com-
promise propensity of the agents, and the last contains
the diffusion effects due to individual deviations from the
average behavior. The presence of both the functions
6P (·) and D(·) is linked to the hypothesis that open-
ness to change of opinion is linked to the opinion it-
self, and decreases as one gets closer to extremal opin-
ions. This corresponds to the natural idea that extreme
opinions are more difficult to change. Various realiza-
tions of these functions can be found in [15]. In all
cases, however, we assume that both P (|v|) and D(|v|)
are non-increasing with respect to |v|, and in addition
0 ≤ P (|v|) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ D(|v|) ≤ 1. Typical examples are
given by P (|v|) = 1− |v| and D(|v|) = √1− v2.
In the absence of the diffusion contribution (Θ, Θ˜ ≡ 0),
(3.1) implies
v∗ + w∗ = v + w + γ(v − w) (P (|v|)− P (|w|)) ,
v∗ − w∗ = (1− γ(P (|v|) + P (|w|))) (v − w).
(3.2)
Thus, unless the function P (·) is assumed constant, P =
1, the total momentum is not conserved and it can in-
crease or decrease depending on the opinions before the
interaction. If P (·) is assumed constant, the conserva-
tion law is reminiscent of analogous conservations which
take place in kinetic theory. In such a situation, thanks
to the upper bound on the coefficient γ, equations (3.1)
correspond to a granular-gas-like interaction [17] where
the stationary state is a Dirac delta centered on the av-
erage opinion. This behavior is a consequence of the fact
that, in a single interaction, the compromise propensity
implies that the difference of opinion is diminishing, with
|v∗ −w∗| = (1− 2γ)|v −w|. Thus, all agents in the soci-
ety will end up with exactly the same opinion. Note that
in this elementary case a constant part of the relative
opinion is restituted after the interaction. In all cases,
however, the second inequality in (3.2) implies that the
difference of opinion is diminishing after the interaction.
We remark, moreover, that, in the absence of diffusion,
the lateral bounds are not violated, since
v∗ = (1− γP (|v|))v + γP (|v|)w,
w∗ = (1− γP (|w|))w + γP (|w|)v,
(3.3)
imply
max {|v∗|, |w∗|} ≤ max {|v|, |w|} .
Let f(v, t) denote the distribution of opinion v ∈ I
at time t ≥ 0. The time evolution of f is recovered
as a balance between bilinear gain and loss of opinion
terms, described in weak form by the integro-differential
equation of Boltzmann type
d
dt
∫
I
ϕ(v)f(v, t) dv = (Q(f, f), ϕ) =〈∫
I2
f(v)f(w)(ϕ(v∗) + ϕ(w∗)− ϕ(v)− ϕ(w))dvdw
〉
,
(3.4)
where (v∗, w∗) are the post-interaction opinions gener-
ated by the pair (v, w) in (3.1).
We remark that equation (3.4) is consistent with the
fact that a suitable choice of the function D(·) in (3.1)
coupled with a small support B of the random variables
implies that both |v∗| ≤ 1 and |w∗| ≤ 1.
The analysis in [15] essentially shows that the micro-
scopic interaction (3.1) is so general that the kinetic equa-
tion (3.4) can describe a variety of different behaviors of
opinion. In its original formulation, both the compro-
mise and the self-thinking intensities were assigned in
terms of the universal constant γ and of the universal
random parameters Θ, Θ˜. Suppose now that these quan-
tities in (3.1) could depend of the personal conviction
of the agent. For example, one reasonable assumption
would be that an individual with high personal conviction
is more resistant to move towards opinion of any other
agent by compromise. Also, an high conviction could im-
ply a reduction of the personal self-thinking. If one agrees
with these assumptions, the binary trade (3.1) has to be
modified to include the effect of conviction. Given two
agents A and B characterized by the pair (x, v) (respec-
tively (y, w)) of conviction and opinion, the new binary
trade between A and B now reads
v∗ = v − γΨ(x)P (|v|)(v − w) + Φ(x)ΘD(|v|),
w∗ = w − γΨ(y)P (|w|)(w − v) + Φ(y)Θ˜D(|w|).
(3.5)
In (3.5) the personal compromise propensity and self-
thinking of the agents are modified by means of the func-
tions Ψ = Ψ(x) and Φ = Φ(x), which depend on the
convictions parameters. In this way, the outcome of the
interaction results from a combined effect of (personal)
compromise propensity, conviction and opinion. Among
other possibilities, one reasonable choice is to fix the func-
tions Ψ(·) and Φ(·) as non-increasing functions. This re-
flects the idea that the conviction acts to increase the
tendency to remain of the same opinion. Among others,
a possible choice is
Ψ(x) = (1 + (x−A)+)−α, Φ(x) = (1 + (x−B)+)−β .
Here A,B, α, β are nonnegative constants, and h(x)+ de-
notes the positive part of h(x). By choosing A > 0 (re-
spectively B > 0), conviction will start to influence the
change of opinion only when x > A (respectively x > B).
It is interesting to remark that the presence of the con-
viction parameter (through the functions Ψ and Φ), is
such that the post-interaction opinion of an agent with
high conviction remains close to the pre-interaction opin-
ion. This induces a mechanism in which the opinions of
agents with low conviction are attracted towards opinions
of agents with high conviction.
Assuming the binary trade (3.5) as the microscopic bi-
nary exchange of conviction and opinion in the system of
agents, the joint evolution of these quantities is described
in terms of the density f = f(x, v, t) of agents which at
time t > 0 are represented by their conviction x ∈ R+
and wealth v ∈ I. The evolution in time of the density
f is described by the following kinetic equation (in weak
7form) [17]
d
dt
∫
R+×I
ϕ(x, v)f(x, v, t) dx dv =
1
2
〈∫
R2+×I2
(
ϕ(x∗, v∗) + ϕ(y∗, w∗)− ϕ(x, v)− ϕ(y, w))×
× f(x, v, t)f(y, w, t)C(z) dx dy dz dv dw
〉
.
(3.6)
In (3.6) the pairs (x∗, v∗) and (y∗, w∗) are obtained from
the pairs (x, v) and (y, w) by (2.1) and (3.5). Note that,
by choosing ϕ independent of v, that is ϕ = ϕ(x), equa-
tion (3.6) reduces to the equation (2.3) for the marginal
density of conviction F (x, t).
To obtain analytic solutions to the Boltzmann-like
equation (3.6) is prohibitive. The main reason is that the
unknown density in the kinetic equation depends on two
variables with different laws of interaction. In addition,
while the interaction for conviction does not depend on
the opinion variable, the law of interaction for the opinion
does depend on the conviction. Also, at difference with
the one-dimensional models, passage to Fokker-Planck
equations (cf. [26] and the references therein) does not
help in a substantial way. For this reason, we will resort
to numerical investigation of (3.6), to understand the ef-
fects of the introduction of the conviction variable in the
distribution of opinions.
IV. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
This section contains a numerical description of the
solutions to the Boltzmann-type equation (3.6). For the
numerical approximation of the Boltzmann equation we
apply a Monte Carlo method, as described in Chapter 4
of [17]. If not otherwise stated the kinetic simulation has
been performed with N = 104 particles.
The numerical experiments will help to clarify the role
of conviction in the final distribution of the opinion den-
sity among the agents. The numerical simulations en-
hance the fact that the density f(x, v, t) will rapidly con-
verge towards a stationary distribution [17]. As usual in
kinetic theory, this stationary solution will be reached in
an exponentially fast time.
The numerical experiments will report the joint den-
sity of conviction and opinion in the agent system. The
opinion variable will be reported on the horizontal axis,
while the conviction variable will be reported on the ver-
tical one. The color intensity will refer to the concentra-
tion of opinions. The following numerical tests have been
considered.
Test 1
In the first test we consider the case of a conviction in-
teraction where the diffusion coefficient in (2.1) is linear,
H(x) = x. As described in Section II the distribution of
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FIG. 4.1: Test 1: The particles solution with N = 10000 par-
ticles and linear H. High diffusion in conviction and reduced
self-thinking (up) compared to low diffusion in conviction and
high self-thinking (down)
conviction in this case is heavy tailed, with an important
presence of agents with high conviction, and a large part
of the population with a mean degree of conviction. In
(3.5) we shall consider
Φ(x) = Ψ(x) =
1
1 + x
.
We further take λ = λB = 0.5 in (2.1), and P (|v|) = 1,
D(|v|) = √1− v2 in (3.5). We consider a population of
agents with an initially uniformly distributed opinion and
a conviction uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 5].
We choose a time step of ∆t = 1 and a final computa-
tion time of t = 50, where the steady state is practically
reached.
Since the evolution of the conviction in the model is
independent from the opinion, the latter is scaled in order
to fix the mean equal to 0. We report the results for the
particle density corresponding to different values of µ, γ
and the variance σ2 of the random variables Θ and Θ˜ in
Figure 4.1. This allows to verify the essential role of the
diffusion processes in conviction and opinion formation.
In Figure 4.3 we plot the marginal densities together with
the tail distribution
F¯(x) = 1−F , G¯(x) = 1− G,
which are plotted in loglog scale to visualize the tails
behavior.
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FIG. 4.2: Test 2: The particles solution with N = 10000
particles and H(x) =
√
x. High diffusion in conviction and
reduced self-thinking (up) compared to low diffusion in con-
viction and high self-thinking (down).
Test 2
In this new test, we maintain the same values for the
parameters, and we modify the diffusion coefficient in
(2.1), which is now assumed as H(x) =
√
x. Within
this choice, with respect to the previous test we expect
the formation of a larger class on undecided agents. The
results are reported in Figure 4.2 for the full density. At
difference with the results of Test 1, opinion is spread
out almost uniformly among people with low conviction.
It is remarkable that in this second test, as expected,
conviction is essentially distributed in the interval [, 5],
at difference with Test 1, where agents reach a conviction
parameter of 20.
The same effect is evident in Figure 4.3, which refers to
both Tests 1 and 2 in which, to understand the evolution
in case of asymmetry, the initial distribution of opinions
was chosen uniformly distributed on the positive part of
the interval.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Opinion formation in a society of agents depends on
many aspects, even if it appears to have very stable fea-
tures, like formation of clusters. In this note, we intro-
duced and discussed a kinetic model for the joint evolu-
tion of opinion in presence of conviction, based on the
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FIG. 4.3: Initial asymmetry in opinion leads to different
opinion-conviction distributions. H(x) = x (up), and H(x) =√
x (down).
assumption that conviction is a relevant parameter that
can influence the distribution of opinion by acting on the
personal attitude to compromise, as well as in limiting
the self-thinking. Numerical experiments put in evidence
that the role of conviction relies in concentrating the final
distribution of opinions towards a well-defined one.
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